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Summary
Th e economic condition in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is dependent on 
the continuous infl ow of money from foreign countries. Under the impact of 
the economic crisis, there is a reduction in foreign donations, remittances from 
abroad, foreign investments and exports are made more diffi  cult, which threatens 
its economic and social stability. In this paper, we investigate the infl uence of 
external disturbances on the balance of payments of BiH, as well as possibilities of 
conducting an economic policy which equalizes the real eff ective and balancing 
foreign exchange rates.
Th e analysis shows that BiH is open up for an external pressure on the balance 
of payments since the Central Bank of BiH conducts neither an exchange rate 
policy nor a foreign exchange reserves policy, and the crisis of the exchange rate 
and the crisis of the foreign exchange reserves take turns in BiH. In order to 
reduce the negative eff ects of the deviation of the real eff ective and balancing 
foreign exchange rates, in BiH it is necessary that prices and salaries be fl exible 
and that structural reforms which would increase the competitiveness of domestic 
enterprises in the foreign market be implemented.
Key words: economic crisis, Contagious Currency Crises, currency board, real 
eff ective foreign exchange rate, balancing eff ective foreign exchange rate
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Резиме
Економско стање у Босни и Херцеговини (БиХ) зависно је од контину-
ираног прилива новца из иностранства. Под утицајем економске кризе до-
лази до смањења иностраних донација, дознака из иностранства, страних 
инвестиција и отежаног извоза што угрожава економску и социјалну ста-
билност. У овом раду истражује се утицај вањских поремећаја на платни 
биланс БиХ, те могућности вођења економске политике којом се уједначава 
реални ефективни и равнотежни девизни курс.
Анализа је показала да је БиХ отворена за вањски притисак на платни 
биланс јер Централна банка БиХ не води ни политику курса, ни политику 
девизних резерви, те да се у БиХ смјењују криза курса и криза девизних ре-
зерви. Да би се смањили негативни ефекти одступања реалног ефективног 
и равнотежног девизног курса, у БиХ је неопходна флексибилност цијена 
и плата, те провођење структурних реформи којим би се повећала конку-
рентност домаћих предузећа на иностраном тржишту. 
Кључне ријечи: економска криза, Contagious Currency Crises, currency board, 
реални ефективни девизни курс, равнотежни ефективни девизни курс
1. Th e burden of the crisis proportional to poverty
Th e spreading and deepening of the economic crisis in the world increasingly 
reveals that the size of a country has a signifi cant infl uence on its resilience to 
a crisis. Until a few years ago, small countries2 were believed to have a series 
of advantages in their development. Usually, Ireland, New Zealand, the Baltic 
countries, Slovenia...were considered to be good examples for that. Th e secret of 
small countries’ success lay in an easy provision of relatively substantial foreign 
investments which, in conditions of global prosperity, very quickly changed the 
economic and social structure of small countries. On the other hand, due to a 
small domestic market, the strengthening of the economies of small countries 
lay on the growth of export. In conditions of global prosperity, the economies 
of small countries had an off er that supported the conjuncture of multinational 
companies and increasing consumption in developed countries. Until the crisis 
appeared, everything had seemed to be harmonious: small countries had been 
2 Th e term “small country” in this paper means a country with a population of up to 10 million, in 
compliance with Kuznets’ defi nition of a small country (Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Small 
Nations, in: Austin Robinson, ed. (1960), Th e Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, New 
York, St. Martin’s Press). Within Commonwealth, a small country means a country with a population 
of less than 1.5 million (A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, Commonwealth 
Advisory Group, 1997).
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developing, ensuring that big companies maintain the production factors’ 
price stability in the conditions of conjuncture. However, together with the 
spreading of the economic crisis in the world, small countries were proved to 
be very vulnerable to the crisis3. Th e relatively small decreases in the infl ow of 
foreign capital4 or decreased exports had as a consequence big disturbances 
in the fi nancial market, the labor market and the falling effi  ciency of business 
doing, whereas the reached level of public consumption and the social safety of 
the population became unsustainable. Also, economically the most powerful 
countries of the world (G20) were making a pressure on small countries to recall 
tax reliefs, which the strategy of attracting foreign investments has founded itself 
on in the past decades5. It became clear that small countries could benefi t from 
global prosperity and also that they were very vulnerable to a fall in conjuncture 
in the world market and that they could not avoid the consequences of the global 
crisis.
Th e experiences of fi ghting the consequences of the crisis are indicative of 
the revision of the strategic approach to the development of both big and small 
countries, as well as multinational companies. As Financial Times observes, “big 
countries are fashionable again”6. Under new circumstances, when stabilization 
measures mostly relying on the reduction in consumption are being implemented 
in developed countries, multinational companies are becoming specially 
interested in countries with potentially big demand, such as China, India, Brazil 
and Russia7. No longer are big companies looking for sub-contractors who will 
3 In Ireland in the year 2010, investments in fi xed assets were reduced by 49% as compared with the 
year 2005, and by 25% compared to the year 2009. In late 2010, the GDP of Ireland was at the level 
of GDP in the year 2004 (Source: Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2011, Central Statistics Offi  ce 
Ireland, pp. 126. and 137).
4 According to the data of the World Bank, the infl ow of capital into developing countries was 
around 727 billion dollars in the year 2008, whereas a year before, it had been 1157.7 billion dollars 
(Source: World Bank Global Development Finance (2009), table 2.1, p. 40.)
5 At the London Summit, on the day of 2 April 2009, G20 reached a decision to take appropriate 
actions towards countries which were not applying the international taxation standards. On 
the basis of that, the OECD presented the “black list” of countries (45 countries) which were 
inconsistent in their implementation of the OECD’s tax regulations. Th e list included Costa Rica, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Uruguay, which never accepted the OECD’s standards, as well as Austria, 
Monaco, Liechtenstein, Holland, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium, which undertook to 
conduct the OECD’s regulations, but did it in an inconsistent manner. (Source: A Progress Report 
on the Jurisdiction Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in Implementing the Internationally 
Agreed Tax Standard, 2nd April 2009)
6 Financial Times, 20 October 2009
7 Th e Confi dence Index for the year 2012 (Th e 2012 A.T. Kearney FDI Confi dence Index®) shows 
that foreign investors have the most confi dence in the stated countries. On a scale from 0 to 3, 
China has the highest index value of 1.87. For a number of years now, China has been inspiring the 
biggest confi dence with foreign investors. In the past years, even more so from the beginning of the 
global economic crisis, investors’ confi dence in India and Brazil, 1.73 and 1.6, respectively, has been 
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only be able to produce favorably; however, they are seeking big markets where 
they will be able to sell. In order to be able to sell in those markets, they must 
upgrade the population’s demand simultaneously, and it is only possible to do if 
they employ the population. Because of that, the development of big countries 
whose economies are undergoing an expansion will be made easier in the decades 
to come. At the same time, small countries will be losing their attractiveness 
for foreign investments since they will be able to off er investors fewer and 
fewer reliefs together with a limited market and a limited reduction in prices 
of domestic resources. Th e development of small undeveloped and developing 
countries will particularly be uncertain8, especially if they are politically unstable, 
too. An increasing number of factors impacting their developing will increasingly 
less be under their control. What is common for all developing countries is that 
their economic and social growth are dependent on foreign investments and the 
possibilities of export, then that they have relatively big balance-of-payments 
defi cits, a high unemployment rate and, frequently, a budget defi cit (Velde 2008). 
Each of these characteristics increases a risk of the deterioration of the social 
and economic condition in the conditions of the development of the crisis in the 
environment. A strategic turn of investors from developed countries towards big 
countries undergoing an expansion, as the shortest path towards the recovery 
of own economies, will leave a profound imprint in the economic and political 
development of small countries. Th ere are prospects that the relative burden of 
the crisis will be proportional to poverty as the contribution to the generation of 
the crisis was proportional to the size of a national economy. Such a possibility 
of the development of events in the years to come puts an obligation before small 
countries to pay special attention to the vulnerability to the external infl uences of 
the crisis and the internal factors of the crisis so as to diminish its eff ects.
2. Th e continuity of the crisis in BiH and its expansion in new 
circumstances
Th e spreading of the world economic crisis into BiH is not responded to by 
the authorities, the business community, unions and the non-government sector 
in a manner similar groups respond to it in other countries. Unfortunately, 
diff erent forms of the crisis and diff erent in their intensity have been present here 
becoming stronger. In the year 2007, India was in the fi ft h and Brazil in the sixth place when foreign 
investors’ confi dence is in question. (Source: Cautious Investors Feed a Tentative Recovery, Th e 
2012 A.T. Kearney FDI Confi dence Index®, Figure 1)
8 According to the data of the International Trade Center, in the fi rst six months of the year 2009, 
incomes from exporting to 49 poorest countries of the world were reduced by 43.8%. (Source: 
Least Developed Countries Suff er Most From Global Trade Slump, International Trade Centre, 
Geneva, 6th October 2009, p. 1.)
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for years. Th e population here has been used to living a hard life, uncertainty, a 
low standard, isolationism, political instability, a bad quality of public services, a 
bad infrastructure, corruption, the ineffi  ciency of the legal state, the violation of 
rights, the limiting of freedoms, a loss of property, a loss of the job… Having been 
exposed to the impact of those factors for a number of years, here, the motivation 
of ordinary people is importantly modifi ed in comparison with the motivation 
of people living in developed western countries in recession. For that reason, 
reactions to the spreading of the crisis are also of a weaker intensity here. Th e weaker 
intensity in responding to the manifestations of the crisis is also demonstrated by 
both citizens and institutions. Th e crisis in BiH has become an ambience where 
one lives, an ambience creating one’s view of the world, of reforms, of the future… 
Unfortunately, betrayed expectations, political deceptions, unsanctioned crime, 
the devastation of the value system and miserable material and spiritual life kill 
the people’s hope for a better future in this country on a daily basis. Although in 
the postwar time period BiH has made signifi cant progress in all fi elds, it is yet 
closer to the label of the condition of a continuous general crisis and is exposed 
to a strong risk of the deterioration of the condition under the infl uence of the 
global fi nancial, economic and social crisis (Tomaš 2010).
Th e general crisis in BiH has several causes. We shall only state some of them 
without the intention and possibility of elaborating them in more detail here. 
Th ey should be discussed separately. It is our goal to show the ambience where 
BiH yields to the impact of the world economic crisis and, on the basis of that, to 
estimate BiH’s possibilities of, at least partly, mitigating its consequences.
Th roughout the postwar time period, BiH has been characterized by a high 
degree of political instability, a lack of economic self-sustainability, the absence of 
the legal state, the low effi  ciency of reforms, a high degree of poverty, the absence 
of effi  cient coordination between diff erent levels of authority, uneconomical and 
expensive institutions and a big role played by the international community. 
Th e stated factors have acted simultaneously and in continuity throughout 
the postwar time period in BiH. Th ere is no aspect of the economic, political 
and social life in BiH which these factors have not been having a bad impact on. 
Consequently, there is no fi eld of social life in BiH which does not have serious 
problems, which is functioning normally, which is not in some form of a crisis…. 
In the postwar time period, BiH has been undergoing a general and continuous 
crisis. Th e world economic crisis impacts the deepening of the general crisis in 
BiH. Th e most expressed directions of the deepening of the general crisis are 
mirrored in a fall in the economic activity, slowing down or ceasing reforms, the 
politicization of the crisis and its consequences, the exacerbation of the issues 
of the allocation of public incomes, the reduction of the possibilities of fi nancial 
transfers, making the reaching of a consensus on borrowing more diffi  cult, the 
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growth of the price for borrowings, the growth of the tax encumbrance of the 
economy and the population, increasing proneness to protectionism, slowing 
down European integrations….
Th e general crisis in BiH has its economic, political and social dimensions. 
Th e world economic crisis will sharpen all the three aspects of the crisis. Truly, 
because of the low level of the economic activity, the total absolute eff ect of the 
losses induced by the crisis in BiH, compared with other countries, can seem to 
be small. Th e biggest damage to BiH, however, will be made exactly through the 
deepening of the general crisis. All that has been done in B&H in the postwar 
time period concerning the improvement of the economic, political and social 
stability has requested many eff orts and much money, and the eff ects have oft en 
been worse than it has been the case in a number of other countries in transition9. 
Th e intensifi cation of the crisis in an ambience which is slowly progressively 
being changed can have as a consequence a very slow recovery of BiH in the post-
crisis time period. It is a fact that BiH can no longer count on a wide international 
fi nancial support similar to the one immediately aft er the war. Th e largest portion 
of the burden of the recovery from the crisis and channeling transition will have 
to be endured by the citizens of BiH. For the duration of the time period of the 
economic crisis, BiH will make a few steps backwards, which could lead it to 
a position when a new beginning will be needed for it to recover. Th e impact 
of the global crisis in BiH shows the depth of its contradictions, the weight of 
its weaknesses, its vulnerabilities to negative external impacts and limitations in 
conducting the macroeconomic policy. 
3. Is BiH infected with the “contagious currency crisis”?
As early as during the 1970’s, economists became more seriously interested in 
the impact of monetary disturbances in a country on the foreign exchange rate, 
reserves, balance of payments and interest rate in other countries. Th e appearance 
9 According to the easiness of its business doing, BiH was ranked as 125th out of 183 countries in 
the year 2012 (WB&IFC, 2011). According to the economic freedom index for the year 2012, BiH 
is in 104th place out of 184 countries, and belongs to a group of countries with a predominantly 
limited economic freedom (Th e Heritage Foundation, 2011). For the time period 2011-2012, 
according to the global competitiveness index, BiH has been classifi ed in 100th place out of 142 
countries (World Economic Forum, 2011). In late 2011, the international agency Standard & Poor’s 
lowered BiH’s sovereign credit rating from “B+” to “B” observed – negative. BiH also has a “B2” 
credit rating with negative outlooks, bestowed by the agency Moody’s Investors Service. Out of 183 
analyzed countries, BiH is number 91 country according to the value of the corruption perception 
index (Transparency International’s, 2011), and, for years, it is a country with the largest perception 
of corruption in South-East Europe.
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of new fi nancial crises was stimulating for the creation of new literature and for 
refi ning methods of analysis10.
As the global economic crisis developed, BiH found itself in a very specifi c 
position. Having chosen the Currency Board and the Euro as its reserve 
currency, BiH renounced the implementation of a monetary policy, i.e. it left  it 
to, fi rst, Deutsche Bundesbank, then to the Central Bank of the EU11. In such 
circumstances, BiH’s monetary system was maintained on relatively high foreign 
exchange reserves12. A high balance-of-payments’ defi cit maintained throughout 
the postwar time period should not be neglected, either. Serious disturbances of 
the world fi nancial market, including the euro zone as well, which the domestic 
currency is linked with through a fi xed relation, have had an almost undisturbed 
impact on BiH’s economy. Facts of the open domestic market, high foreign-trade 
dependence and the absence of a discretionary monetary policy speak in favor of 
this assertion. In such circumstances, it is justifi ed to ask ourselves how big the 
external pressure on BiH’s economy is and if it has already been infected with 
the “contagious currency crisis” (Contagious Currency Crises, Eichengreen et al. 
1996). To confi rm that, we shall use the external pressure index (Edwards 2004a: 
22) generated on the basis of the modifi cation of the foreign exchange market 
pressure index (Eichengreen et al. 1996)13:
(1) et
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10 A detailed account of the literature is available in: Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, Charles 
Wyplosz (1996),  Contagious Currency Crises, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working 
Paper 5681, Cambridge MA i Sebastian Edwards (2004), Th irty Years of Current Account Imbalances, 
Current Account Reversals, and Sudden Stops, IMF Staff  Papers, Vol. 51, Special Issue, © 2004 
International Monetary Fund
11 Th e Central Bank of BiH was established on the day of 20th June 1997 by the Law on Central 
Bank adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Th e Central Bank began to operate on the 
day of 11 August 1997. From the very beginning of its operations to the establishment of the Euro-
Zone, the Deutsche Mark was being used as the reserve currency. Th e fi xed exchange rate was 1:1.
12 In late September 2011, BiH’s foreign exchange reserves were 6.24 billion convertible marks (the 
data provided by the Central Bank of BiH). 
13 Th e index of the pressure of the foreign-exchange market developed by B. Eichengreen, A. Rose 
and C. Wyplosz is presented by the following equation: 
EMP = [(α % Δei,t ) + (βΔ(ii,t – iG,t)) - (γ ( % Δri,t - % ΔrG,t))], 
where: ei,t – the exchange rate of the ith currency in the time period t, ii,t  - the interest rate for the ith 
currency in the time period t,  iG,t  - the interest rate in Germany in the time period t (the research 
was conducted on the example of the impact of changes in Germany on other countries), ri,t – 
the foreign-exchange reserves of the ith country in the  time period t, rG,t – the foreign-exchange 
reserves of Germany in the time period t; α, β and γ weights. Th e condition of a crisis emerges if the 
value of the pressure of the foreign-exchange market for the given time period t is bigger than the 
sum of the average value of the index and 1.5 of the standard deviations of the index in the analyzed 
time period (Eichengreen at al. 1996, pp. 23-24).
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In the above equation, Δe/e represents the rate of change in the foreign 
exchange rate in time t, ΔR/R is the rate of change in the foreign exchange reserves 
in time t, σe stands for the standard deviation of change in the foreign exchange 
rate, and σR represent the standard deviation of change in the foreign exchange 
reserves in the analyzed time period14.
Th e external pressure causes the crisis (Ct=1) in the analyzed country at the 
given moment if the value of the It index for the given moment is higher than 
the average value of the analyzed time period index increased by k standard 
deviations of the index changes (σI), and therefore:
Ct = 1 (crisis) if It > than the sum of the average values of It + kσI and
Ct = 0 (there is no crisis) for the other values of It 
To precisely demonstrate what type of adaptation is needed to avoid the crisis, 
two alternative indicators of the crisis are set (Edwards 2004a: 23). Th ey help 
identify the origin of the balance-of-payments crisis as a consequence of a great 
reduction in foreign exchange reserves (Crisis-Res) or a consequence of a big 
devaluation (Crisis-Er). A crisis of reserves happens when there is a reduction 
in foreign exchange reserves without an adequate adaptation of the currency 
foreign-exchange rate, whereas an exchange-rate crisis happens once there is a 
depreciation of a domestic currency faster and sooner than it is the case with a 
fall in a country’s foreign-exchange reserves. 
To establish whether and to which extent BiH is enduring the external pressure 
in the conditions of the global crisis due to the policy of the exchange rate and 
foreign-exchange reserves, a careful selection of data which will be the basis of 
the analysis needs to be carried out. Th e exchange rate of the convertible mark 
(KM) and the euro is legally fi xed at 1.95583 KM for 1 euro, so, there is no rate 
of the exchange rate change, i.e. Δe/e = 0. In pursuance of that, σe = 0 as well, so, 
also, It = 0 if we observed the domestic currency against the euro. It is clear that, 
in this case, the value It = 0 originates from the fi xed exchange rate, not from the 
market neutrality of the relation between the convertible mark and the euro. Th e 
fi xed exchange rate creates an eff ect of the non-existence of the crisis (Ct = 0), i.e. 
an eff ect of a neutral monetary impact towards the euro zone because the Central 
Bank of the EU de facto conducts the monetary policy of B&H. For that reason, 
we chose to monitor changes in the nominal exchange rate of the euro and the 
American dollar in the analysis15. In that manner, indirectly, through the fi xed 
14 Th e index of the external pressure (It) diff ers from the index of the pressure of the foreign-
exchange market pressure (EMP) in that it does not include data of changes in interest rates. Th e 
reason why the reduced index is frequently applied lies in the fact that a large number of countries 
do not possess long-term series of data of the interest rate (Edwards 2004a, p. 23).    
15 European Central Bank, ECB reference exchange rate, US dollar/Euro, Monthly Bulletin, T0802, 
October 2011.
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exchange rate of KM and the euro, we are monitoring changes in the exchange 
rate of KM and the American dollar as well. Th e advantage of such an approach is 
refl ected in the availability of a series of data with the average monthly values of 
the exchange rate beginning from January 1999 and ending in October 2011. On 
the other hand, the CB of BiH’s monthly data of the foreign exchange reserves of 
BiH in the same time period are also available. 
Th e done calculations of relative changes in the exchange rate, foreign currency 
reserves and appropriate standard deviations resulted as follows: the average 
value of Ît = - 0.0063988, the standard deviation of change in the exchange rate 
σe = 0.0257443, the standard deviation of change in the foreign-exchange reserves 
σR = 0.0739769, and the standard deviation of changes in index σI = 0.0071213. 
In this analysis we used the ordinary value of k = 1.5 σI 16. On the grounds of the 
resulting magnitudes, we formed the limits of the interval in which the varying 
of the index value is not classifi ed as a crisis:
Upper limit of the interval: Ît + 1.5 σI = 0.0042831
Bottom limit of the interval: Ît – 1.5 σI = -0.01708
By comparing the resulting values of the interval of the external pressure for 
each month in the analyzed interval with the values of the limits of the crisis, 
we observe that, almost throughout the analyzed time period, BiH undergoes a 
balance-of-payments crisis. For the duration of each year, the value of the index 
is retained for a couple of months within the limits without an expressed external 
pressure, only to move into the zone of crisis, in an either positive or negative 
direction, depending on whether the index value is more impacted by change in 
the exchange rate of the euro and the dollar or change in the foreign-exchange 
reserves of BiH (Picture 1).
Picture 1: Index of the external pressure
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16 Some analyses (Edwards 2004a, Labus and Milošević 2009) set the limits of the index critical 
value more fl exibly (k = 2). In this case of ours, using the value of k = 2 would not change the basic 
tendency more signifi cantly.
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Th e tendency existing throughout the analyzed time period did not change 
more signifi cantly aft er the development of the global fi nancial crisis and its 
expansion into BiH as well. Truly, the oscillations in the index have been more 
visible since the last quarter of the year 2007 as compared with the years 2006 and 
2005, however yet more stable if compared with the time period from the year 
1999 to the year 2003. So, the global economic crisis did not cause the balance-
of-payments crisis in BiH. Th e “contagious currency crisis” has been inserted into 
the economic system of BiH.
It is obvious that BiH is open up to the external pressure on the balance of 
payments and that the crisis of the exchange rate and the crisis of the foreign 
exchange reserves take turns. BiH does not conduct an exchange rate policy, 
either; nor does it conduct a foreign-exchange reserves policy. Th e exchange rate 
of all currencies in BiH has de facto been derived from the exchange rate of the 
euro against those currencies, whereas foreign-exchange reserves depend on the 
current buying and selling of the convertible mark. Th ere is no form of a policy 
for adapting the exchange rate or reserves whatsoever conducted by the Central 
Bank of BiH. However, as the analysis demonstrates, the external pressures on the 
balance of payments exist as a reality infl uencing the stability of business doing 
in BiH. Th e absence of a policy for adapting to external pressures by which the 
pressures would be neutralized extorts internal adaptations via relative prices and 
an internal silent devaluation of the convertible mark. Th e policy of adaptation 
directed towards the elimination of the exchange rate crisis and the reserves crisis 
is left  to the European Central Bank and the free market. Having a premonition 
arising from the movement of the index of the external pressure on BiH’s balance 
of payments, neither of these two regulators has proved effi  cient. In BiH the crisis 
of the exchange rate and the reserves crisis take turns every couple of months. 
Th e consequence of that is the establishment of unstable conditions for doing 
business.
A high balance-of-payments defi cit is not the cause of the described external 
pressures on the balance of payments. BiH would be facing an external pressure 
even if it had balanced the balance of payments. Th e cause is the fi xed exchange 
rate of the convertible mark against the euro, i.e. the currency board. Indirectly, 
the cause is the policy of the exchange rate of the euro conducted by the Central 
Bank of the EU, which only accidentally coincides with the interests of BiH’s 
economy because, primarily, it is subordinated to the stability of the business 
doing conditions in the euro zone. However, it does not mean the balance-of-
payments defi cit is not a very serious threat to BiH’s further stepping deeper into 
a severer form of the economic crisis. 
19
 Limited Possibilities of Adapting the Economy of Bosnia and 
Rajko Tomaš Herzegovina to the External Pressures of the Economic Crisis
4. A high balance-of-payments defi cit – a permanent potential source 
of crisis
Th e postwar concept of the development of BiH, defi ned by the international 
community, could briefl y be described by one attitude: to ensure a signifi cant 
international fi nancial support for BiH until peace has stabilized and reforms 
for BiH have been implemented; aft er that, the infl ow of foreign investments 
will make its economy self-sustainable. Simultaneously, it is a framework within 
which the currency board can be effi  cient. Also, although offi  cially not established 
as a fact, the starting basis for constituting BiH is an assumption of the balance-
of-payments defi cit as a source of foreign accumulation which will have a 
positive impact on development and an overall macroeconomic stability through 
increasing investments.
Th e international community has ensured a signifi cant fi nancial support for 
BiH, of which a big portion of money has been of non-return nature17. However, 
the predominant portion of the money has been spent in the Federation of BiH, 
a signifi cant portion has been returned to the donor-countries via the purchase 
of their products and services and, observed as a whole, the international 
fi nancial support has not been used up in an effi  cient manner. Neither have the 
implementation of reforms and infl ows of foreign investment been carried out 
according to the initial plan. Th e international fi nancial aid has been exhausted, 
the reforms have slowly and inconsistently been implemented and the interest 
of foreign investors concerning their investing in BiH is far from the expected 
one. In such circumstances, the economic system of BiH is becoming extremely 
vulnerable to the infl ow of money from abroad.
Th e spreading of the global crisis into BiH has signifi cantly reduced 
consumption, and, via reduction in imports, the current account defi cit in BiH 
as well, but has also had an impact on a decrease in foreign demand for products 
from BiH and a fall in their prices18. Remittances from abroad, which are a very 
signifi cant factor of the sustainability of the balance of payments, have become 
fewer. Th e banking capital is predominantly of a foreign origin and has been 
exposed to additional risk due to the fact that parent banks are in the market 
17 According to “Pregled donacija za BiH u periodu 1996-2005” (Engl. Overview of Donations 
for BiH in the Time Period 1996-2005) issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Relations of BiH, the international community ensured 7.2 billion convertible marks (around 
3.6 billion euros) of non-return funds and around 4 billion convertible marks (2 billion euros) of 
favorable loans for BiH.
18 Due to the reduction in imports and consumption under the infl uence of the crisis, the relative 
signifi cance of the current account defi cit is falling. In the year 2008, the current account defi cit 
represented 14.4% of GDP, and in the year 2011, it accounted for around 5.5% (IMF Country Report 
No. 10/348).
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aff ected by the fi nancial crisis. Foreign investments are being reduced19, the 
conditions of borrowings are worsening, liabilities for foreign debts are becoming 
due for collection, the interest rate is growing as well as the ill-liquidity of the 
economy and the state…. Th e tendencies encouraged by the spreading of the crisis 
into BiH, except for the reduction in imports, are having a negative impact on the 
infl ow of money in BiH, which increases its proneness to further stepping into a 
deeper form of the crisis. Th e reduction in the balance-of-payments defi cit via the 
reduction in consumption has a limited stabilization reach, especially because that 
reduction has, for the most part, been due to the reduction in production, even so 
the one intended for exports. Although imports have been reduced, the balance-
of-payments current account defi cit is still high20, and the risk of money infl ows 
from abroad has increased. In such conditions, the continuous maintenance of the 
balance-of-payments defi cit as a way to transform foreign savings into domestic 
investments, which has been characteristic for BiH throughout the postwar time 
period, threatens, in a case of an abrupt discontinuation of money infl ows from 
foreign countries and a possibility of borrowing, to lead to a strong crisis which 
will impose rigorous measures with an aim to reduce the defi cit, including all bad 
consequences for production, consumption and employment.
Recent economic literature warns us of a risk of maintaining the balance-of-
payments defi cit upon macroeconomic stability, especially the one of insuffi  ciently 
developed countries and countries with developing markets. Calvo (Calvo 
1998) referred to big sudden falls in the infl ow of foreign capital as “a sudden 
stop”, illustrating their impact on a country’s solvency and the productivity of 
the available capital. Later works (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía 2004, 2008) have 
developed a model for monitoring possibilities of the appearance of the sudden 
stop in conditions of a high balance-of-payments defi cit. A sudden fall in the 
capital fl ow, provoked by exogenous factors, is marked as “a systemic sudden 
stop” (Calvo, Izquierdo i Mejía 2008). On the basis of an empirical analysis of 
external shocks, Edwards (Edwards 2009) comes to a conclusion that the growth 
of the real interest rate in the world is indicative of a reduction in global liquidity, 
which increases the developing market’s proneness to “a sudden stop”. 
Th e impact of the crisis on BiH had as a consequence a reduction in exports 
(-17.6% in 2009), but also a stronger reduction in imports (-24.2% in 2009). Th e 
reduction in consumption, the production and fi nal ones, had an instantaneous 
stabilizing impact on the balance-of-payments defi cit. However, the reduction 
in the production consumption in conditions of high unemployment does not 
19 Th e value of the net direct foreign investments in BiH was 12.94% of GDP in the year 2007, only 
to fall to merely 0.1% of GDP in the year 2010 (Financial Sector Benchmarking System, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina High Level Financial Sector Overview, Partners for Financial Stability, October 2011).
20 In late 2010, the current account defi cit was 1.36 billion KM (Source: Godišnji izvještaj za 2010. 
godinu, CBBiH / Annual Report for the Year 2010, CB of BiH, p. 33)
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contribute to macroeconomic stability in the long run. As soon as during the 
very fi rst months of the crisis, the reduction in exports slowed down the growth 
of domestic production and increased unemployment. During the years 2010 
and 2011, exports increased, even over those in the pre-crisis time period, but 
imports increased as well. Th roughout the postwar time period, a relatively 
high trade-balance and balance-of-payments current account defi cits have been 
maintained.21 Also, it should be noticed that, in the year 2007, the external debt 
of BiH was 3.96 billion KM, and in late 2011, it was 6.65 billion KM, i.e. in only 
four years, it increased by 67.93%. All that suffi  ciently illustrates a high degree of 
the dependence of the macroeconomic stability and economic sustainability of 
BiH on money infl ows from abroad. Th e experience BiH has gained aft er the year 
2008 shows that: (a) the maintenance and growth of exports are a precondition to 
the maintenance of economic stability and (b) that borrowing from abroad has a 
limit, very short in terms of time, when it has a stabilizing impact. In compliance 
with the experience gained through facing with destructive consequences of an 
abrupt reduction in money infl ows from foreign countries, BiH is in need for 
a new approach in the regulation of foreign trade relations, conducting a real 
exchange rate policy, stimulating foreign investments as well as a goods prices 
policy, a labor market and salary policy. Th is is important, and even more so, 
if we have in mind BiH’s European orientation. Joining the European Union 
understands the fulfi llment of very precise conditions of economic stability 
and sustainability, such as low infl ation, a stable exchange rate of the domestic 
currency, a stable budget and a low interest rate. Relatively low infl ation and the 
stable exchange rate are maintained thanks to the currency board, whereas the 
general government budget has been recording a defi cit in recent years, and the 
interest rate is signifi cantly higher than it is in the European Union. It is a fact 
that, in conditions of the crisis, BiH is moving further and further away from 
desirable macroeconomic indicators for entering the European Union, and that 
it will be increasingly more visible unless it ensures a stable infl ow of money from 
foreign countries.
In a strategic sense, BiH should increase its exports and foreign investments. 
It is much easier to conclude that these are two key strategic directions than make 
at least small progress towards their realization. In order to increase exports, the 
21 Th e high trade balance defi cit has been maintained throughout the time period of BiH’s 
independence. In late 2011, the trade balance defi cit was – 7.3 billion KM or around 28.9% of GDP, 
although, due to a fall in consumption, imports contracted. (Source: Statistika robne razmjene 
sa inostranstvom, Saopštenje br. 12, 25.01.2012, Agencija za statistiku BiH / Statistics of Goods 
Exchange with Foreign Countries, Communiqué No.12, 25 Jan 2012, Agency for Statistics of BiH). 
Because of the reduction in imports and consumption under the infl uence of the crisis, the relative 
signifi cance of the current account defi cit is falling. In 2008, the current account defi cit accounted 
for 14.4% of GDP, and in 2011, it was around 5.5% (IMF Country Report No. 10/348).
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domestic economy must be competitive in the foreign market, i.e. exports must 
be lucrative. Given the fact that BiH is a small market, only if exports from BiH are 
lucrative can foreign investors show interest in producing in BiH and exporting 
goods to other countries. Th erefore, the strategic directions condition each other 
mutually and, essentially, reduce to the following: domestic production must be 
more competitive. 
In BiH, it is rather broadly believed that a stable exchange rate is ensured by 
fi xing the nominal exchange rate of the convertible mark and the euro. Also, it 
is believed to be suffi  ciently encouraging for the domestic economy, and that all 
problems of the foreign trade exchange of BiH’s economy originate from domestic 
enterprises’ insuffi  cient competitiveness. However, the nominal exchange rate of 
a currency, irrespective of how stable it is, is not an indicator of the economy’s 
competitiveness in a foreign market. Th is can be reasoned on the basis of the 
real foreign exchange rate representing the nominal exchange rate defl ated by 
the index of domestic prices and the index of foreign prices. However, such 
a generated real exchange rate of the domestic currency is not by defi nition a 
balancing real foreign exchange rate. It is only balancing if, at the moment of the 
maturity of international fi nancial liabilities, it ensures the balance of the balance 
of payments. If it is not the case, i.e. if there is a surplus or a defi cit of the balance-
of-payments current account, the real foreign exchange rate of the domestic 
currency is not balancing because it is either underestimated or overestimated. 
Th roughout the postwar time period, BiH has had a defi cit of the balance-of-
payments current account. Th at is an unambiguous indicator of the overestimation 
of the domestic currency’s exchange rate against its balancing level. Also, it 
confi rms that exporters from BiH have an additional burden threatening their 
competitiveness in the foreign market, and importers are additionally stimulated. 
Simultaneously, that is one reason more for an insuffi  cient number of foreign 
investors in BiH who would be producing in BiH and exporting goods.
5. Th e policy of adapting to the currency board conditions
Th e Central Bank of BiH monitors the movement of the Nominal Eff ective 
Exchange Rate (NEER) and the Real Eff ective Exchange Rate (REER) by using the 
IMF’s adapted methodology. According to the methodology, NEER represents 
the sum indicator of the change of the nominal value of the convertible mark 
against the weighted average of the change of the nominal exchange rates of 
the main trading partners of BiH. REER is generated by correcting NEER by a 
diff erence at the amount of the infl ation in BiH and the countries considered to 
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be the main trading partners.22 Th e movement of NEER is used as an indicator of 
the competitiveness of the domestic economy. If REER (depreciation) increases, 
the competitiveness of the domestic economy will grow in comparison with the 
economies of the main trading partners because the real value of the domestic 
currency is decreased, so domestic goods are cheaper and the imported ones are 
more expensive in the domestic market. It works the other way round, too, i.e. 
the reduction in REER (appreciation) represents a threat to the competitiveness 
of the domestic economy in a foreign market by increasing the real value of the 
domestic currency and by making domestic goods more expensive, and the 
imported ones cheaper in the domestic market.
Th e latest measurements of NEER and REER23 show that, in the fourth quarter 
in 2011, KM appreciated nominally the most against the Hungarian forint 
(6.8%), the Polish zloty (5.2%) and the Czech koruna (3.8%), and it depreciated 
the most against the Swiss franc (2.7%). During the year 2011, KM appreciated 
nominally the most against the Turkish lira (18.4%), and depreciated the most 
against the Swiss franc (4.6%). Th e movement of REER in late 2011 also confi rms 
the continuation of the real appreciation of KM. 
Bear in mind the fact that the movement of NEER is generated from the 
exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of the countries which are BiH’s 
foreign trade partners. Also, the movement of REER depends on the movement 
of NEER. Th erefore, the competitiveness of the economy of BiH in the market of 
the most important foreign trade partners of BiH is, to a high degree, dependent 
on the exchange rate of the euro and the national currencies of those countries. 
Th e appreciation of KM reduces the price competitiveness of BiH’s economy in 
the markets of the most signifi cant foreign trade partners, and BiH has a relatively 
small impact on that. Th at is an autonomous economic policy which is emerging 
and is imposed on BiH as a consequence of the currency board.
In the fi rst postwar years, due to the international donations as a reliable 
infl ow of money, the pressure of the overestimation of the exchange rate of 
the convertible mark on the domestic economy was weaker. However, as the 
previous analysis has revealed, the problem related to the overestimation of the 
exchange rate will be increasingly more diffi  cult for the economy of BiH: there 
are almost no foreign donations, foreign remittances are fewer and fewer, there is 
a limit to decreasing consumption, and the possibilities of borrowings in foreign 
countries are increasingly more unfavorable. Th e fi xed nominal exchange rate 
and renouncing the conducting of a discretionary monetary policy present a very 
22 To gain a better insight into the methodology of the calculation of NEER and REER, see 
“Metodološka objašnjenja”, Centralna banka BiH, str. 14-16 / Methodological Explanations, Central 
Bank of BiH, pp. 14-16
23 Bulletin of CB of BiH No. 4/2011, pp. 104-106.
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diffi  cult manner of adapting and achieving competitiveness before the economic 
policy decision-makers and before BiH’s economy. 
In order to gain a more precise insight into the seriousness of the raising of 
the competitiveness of BiH’s economy, we suggest that we should begin with the 
mathematical formula for calculating REER:
(2) 1
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where: ei – the nominal foreign exchange rate of the currency of the ith country 
(the price of the unit of a foreign currency expressed in the domestic currency), 
αi – the trade weight of the ith country, pi – the price index in the ith country 
and , pd – the domestic prices index. Th e trade weight for the countries-
foreign trade partners is most frequently calculated according to the IMF’s 
methodology. Th e trade weight of the ith country is calculated as:
(3) i e e I Iv w v wα = +
where: ve – the share of the ith country in the total domestic exports, vI – the 
share of the ith country in the total domestic imports, we – the weight of the 
exports of the ith country and wI – the weight of the exports of ith country.
A country with the fi xed exchange rate of the domestic currency against the 
reserve currency cannot have an infl uence on the exchange rate of the domestic 
currency and the currencies of the biggest foreign trade partners, but derives that 
exchange rate from the exchange rate of the reserve currency and the currencies of 
the countries-the biggest foreign trade partners. So, parameter ei is independent of 
the economic policy of BiH. Also, the foreign prices index (pi). Th e trade weights 
of foreign trade partners can, through the policy of imports and exports, be partly 
infl uenced by the economic policy in BiH. We say “partly” because REER usually 
deviates upwards or downwards against the balancing foreign exchange rate, so, 
in conditions when there is no possibility of adapting the nominal exchange rate, 
that fact in and of itself has a stimulating or discouraging infl uence on exports, 
i.e. imports. Th e non-monetary policy of stimulating or discouraging exports, i.e. 
imports, can have a certain limited impact on the value of the trade weight (αi) 
in such conditions. Th e economic policy in BiH can have the biggest infl uence 
on the REER value via the domestic prices index (pd). We mention that countries 
conducting a discretionary monetary policy can quickly change the nominal 
exchange rate and at the same time have a stronger infl uence on the parameters 
of the trade weight. So, they have at their disposal more effi  cient mechanisms of 
adapting REER and the balancing level of the real exchange rate.
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BiH is being faced with an accelerated decrease in the infl ow of money from 
abroad due to the reduction in donations, remittances and investments, which 
increases expectations from the exporting economy to, through increasing 
exports, ensure suffi  cient foreign exchange assets for maintaining a high level of 
foreign exchange reserves as a precondition for the preservation of the currency 
board. Th rough the previous analysis, we have come to a conclusion that the 
maintaining of a defi cit of the balance-of-payments current account brings about 
the appreciation of REER against the balancing foreign exchange rate, by which 
exports are discouraged and imports are encouraged. So, from the aspect of the 
stabilizing macroeconomic policy, the situation is a paradoxical one: without 
exports, there is no sustainability of the key levers of economic stability, and 
exporters are systemically discouraged from exporting. In that way, a very serious 
problem has already opened before BiH’s authorities. It is obvious that the existing 
condition is not sustainable in the long run. Th e exacerbation of the economic 
crisis that can threaten BiH’s foreign exchange reserves, too, is more certain to 
happen. In such circumstances, BiH would have to consider a possibility of leaving 
the currency board or the devaluation of the domestic currency, i.e. change of 
the fi xed exchange rate against the reserve currency. In addition to that, the 
economic crisis has undermined the foundations of the euro, which represents an 
additional complication in BiH’s monetary system. Leaving the currency board 
in the now political, economic and social circumstances in BiH would have as a 
consequence further macroeconomic destabilization because it is hardly likely 
that the Central Bank of BiH, conducting a discretionary monetary policy, could 
maintain the stability of the domestic currency. Neither the devaluation of the 
domestic currency against the reserve currency would present better results 
because, very soon, infl ation would annul all the eff ects of stimuli to exports, 
then it would be a threat to the standard of the population with fi xed incomes 
and would increase the foreign debt expressed in the domestic currency. In that 
way, making REER closer to the balancing foreign exchange rate would be of a 
short breath.
Having in view the previously said, the room for conducting an economic 
policy in BiH which would stimulate the economy to export more and, thus, 
indirectly contribute to macroeconomic stability and the mitigation of pressures 
on the stability emerging due to the reduction in the infl ow of foreign money 
is narrowing. Subsidizing exports could not be a replacement for the non-
stimulating foreign exchange rate because BiH has made commitments to the 
European Union that it will be protecting the market competition, i.e. will be 
controlling the system of the state aid in compliance with the principles applied 
in the European Union. Th erefore, BiH has at its disposal the adaptation of REER 
and the balancing foreign exchange rate via goods prices and salaries in the 
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domestic market. However, gaining a more detailed insight into the movement 
of prices, the goods market condition and the condition of the labor market, as 
well as the commitments BiH has made in the liberalization of the market and the 
convergence of prices in the process of integrating into the European Union, the 
possibilities of adapting REER and the balancing foreign exchange rate through 
the fl exibility of prices for goods and labor are rather limited.
From the beginning of the year 2005 to mid-2008, prices were being increased 
more quickly than in the euro zone, which is the most important foreign trade 
partner of BiH. From mid-2008 to the third quarter of the year 2009, the prices 
index in BiH was lower than the index in the euro zone, only to later be above 
the euro zone’s index again and keep such a level until today. For the duration of 
the process of its integration into the European Union, BiH will have to carry out 
the compliance of excises for certain products and prices for certain goods and 
services (for example: tobacco and oil derivatives excises), which will be making 
an additional pressure on the growth of prices in BiH in the years to come. 
Because of the continued defi cit of the balance-of-payments current account 
and a bad credit rating of BiH, the interest rate on credits is signifi cantly higher 
than the one in the euro zone, which, also, makes an additional pressure on the 
maintenance of relatively high costs of fi nancing and prices. Th e labor market 
in BiH is not functioning perfectly, so the possibilities of adaption through the 
labor price are of a limited nature. Th e purchase power of salaries of a large 
number of the employed is very low24, so that high unemployment does not have 
an infl uence on the reduction in salaries. Lowering the existing level of salaries 
would endanger pension payout and the social protection of a large number of 
people25 because the off -the-budget funds’ incomes are directly tied to the mass 
of paid-out salaries. Also, that would have an infl uence on the reduction in public 
incomes, too, presenting a threat to the budget’s liquidity. Apart from the said, we 
should notice that the adaptation of REER and the balancing foreign exchange 
rate through goods prices and the market labor is a very slow process. 
Th e previous fi ndings are discouraging. In the current internal circumstances 
and under the pressure of the global economic crisis, BiH practically has no 
possibility of conducting a policy of the adaptation of REER and the balancing 
foreign exchange rate or they are reduced to the minimum. Th e only one 
24 Th e BiH’s population’s purchase power in the year 2010 accounted for merely around 30% of the 
average of the European Union (Bosna i Hecegovina u brojevima 2011, Agencija za statistiku BiH, 
str. 25) (Bosnia and Herzegovina in Figures 2011, Agency for Statistics of BiH, p. 25).
25 In BiH in the year 2011, there were 90 pensioners and 77 unemployed persons per each 100 
employed workers. Th ere are no offi  cial estimations of the size of poverty in BiH. According to the 
estimations presented by the World Bank for the year 2011, 18% of the population in BiH are below 
the poverty line (less than 2.5 $US per day), and even 48% of the population are at the poverty line 
(between 2.5 and 5 $US per day).
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possibility lies in reforms which would change the business environment, 
stimulate an increase in foreign investments and improve the competitiveness 
of domestic enterprises in the foreign market. Unfortunately, BiH pays little 
attention to that26. 
6. Conclusion
Th e economic sustainability of BiH is dependent on the infl ow of money from 
abroad and the possibilities of exporting. In conditions of the strongly impacting 
global economic crisis, there is a fall in the infl ow of money from foreign countries, 
and the possibilities of exporting are becoming limited so that there is an increase 
in the risk of the worsening of the social and economic conditions. A reason 
more for our concern is the fact that, throughout the postwar time period, BiH 
has been characterized by a high degree of political and economic instability, as 
well as a big role played the international community in almost all spheres of life.
Because of liberalized trade, a high degree of foreign trade dependence, 
the balance-of-payments defi cit and a lack of a discretionary monetary policy, 
disturbances coming from the international fi nancial market have an almost 
uninterrupted impact on the economy of BiH. However, our research has shown 
that the global economic crisis has not caused the balance-of-payments crisis in 
BiH. Via the currency board, the “contagious currency crisis” has been inserted 
into the economic system of BiH. BiH is open up for an external pressure on 
the balance of payments and the crisis of the exchange rate and the foreign 
exchange reserves crisis take turns in BiH because the Central Bank of BiH is not 
conducting an exchange rate policy or a foreign exchange reserves policy, either. 
Th e exchange rate of all currencies in BiH has been derived from the exchange 
rate of the euro against those currencies, whereas the foreign exchange reserves 
depend on the current market buying and selling of the convertible mark. Th e 
absence of an exchange rate policy and a foreign currency reserves policy which 
would neutralize external pressures on the balance of payments imposes a need 
for adaptations through relative prices and a silent devaluation of the convertible 
mark. So, the policy of eliminating the crisis of the exchange rate and the crisis 
of the reserves is left  to the European Central Bank and the free market. Th e 
movement of the index of the external pressure on BiH’s balance of payments 
shows that neither of these two regulators has been effi  cient. In BiH, the crisis 
26 Many studies (Doing Business in a more transparent world 2012, Th e World Bank and IFC, 
2011; Th e Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, World Economics Forum, 2011; Highlights 
of the 2012 Index of Economic Freedoms, Th e Heritage Foundation, 2011; Nations in Transit 
2011, Freedom House, 2011, Kreditni rejting BiH, Standard and Poour’s 2011; Moody’s Investors 
Service 2011...) demonstrate a very bad ranking of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to a series of 
competitiveness indicators.
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of the exchange rate and the crisis of the reserves, i.e. the overestimation and 
underestimation of REER against the balancing exchange rate, take turns every 
couple of months, which has as a consequence the establishment of unstable 
conditions for business doing. Th e defi cit of BiH’s balance-of-payments current 
account is not the cause of the described external pressures on the balance of 
payments. Th ey would exist even if BiH had a balanced balance of payments. 
Th at does not mean the balance-of-payments defi cit is not a serious threat to 
BiH’s further stepping deeper into a severer form of the economic crisis. 
In conditions of reduced international economic aid, slow and inconsistent 
reforms, a low credit rating of the country and the low competitiveness of the 
domestic economy, BiH’s economic system is extremely vulnerable to the infl ow 
of money from foreign countries. Th e reduction in the infl ow of money from 
abroad increases expectations that, by increasing exports, the export-oriented 
economy will ensure suffi  cient foreign exchange funds for the maintenance of 
the high level of foreign exchange reserves as a precondition for the preservation 
of the currency board. Th e defi cit of the balance-of-payments current account, 
which has been maintained in BiH throughout the postwar time period, is the 
indicator that the exchange rate of the domestic currency is overestimated against 
its balancing level. Th e maintaining of the defi cit of the balance-of-payments 
current account brings about the appreciation of REER against the balancing 
foreign exchange rate, which discourages exports and stimulates imports. So, from 
the aspect of a stabilizing macroeconomic policy, the situation is of a paradoxical 
nature: there is no sustainability of the key levers of economic stability without 
exports, and exporters are systemically discouraged from exporting. Such a 
condition is not sustainable in the long run. Th ere are four possibilities before the 
authorities of BiH: (1) to leave the currency board, (2) to devalue the domestic 
currency, i.e. change the fi xed exchange rate against the reserve currency, (3) to 
adapt REER and the balancing exchange rate through prices and salaries in the 
conditions of the currency board, and (4) to introduce structural reforms oriented 
towards stimulating foreign investments and increasing the competitiveness of 
the domestic economy.
It is little probable that, in the now conditions and conducting a discretionary 
monetary policy, the Central Bank of BiH could preserve the stability of the 
domestic currency. Also, if there were the devaluation of the domestic currency 
against the reserve currency, infl ation would very quickly annul all the eff ects 
of stimulating exports and endanger the standard of the population receiving 
fi xed incomes. Th e adaptation of REER and the balancing foreign exchange rate 
through prices for goods and salaries in the domestic market is limited by the 
market condition and commitments of BiH in the liberalization of the market 
and the convergence of prices in the process of its integration into the European 
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Union. Reforms which would change the business environment, stimulate an 
increase in foreign investments and improve the competitiveness of domestic 
enterprises in the foreign market could have the smallest limitations and bear 
the smallest risk for a successful infl uence on the adaptation of REER and the 
balancing exchange rate in BiH. 
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